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Abstract:
Background:
Over the years, different explanations have been given on the relationship between syntax and Theory of Mind, i.e., the ability to
attribute mental states to others and predict, describe, and explain behavior based on such mental states. In the present study, we
focus on the relationship between false-belief understanding as a crucial aspect of Theory of Mind, and on the ability to master the
syntax of complementation, i.e., the ability to produce and comprehend sentences in a recursive way.
Objective:
Our purpose is to test two main hypotheses on the relationship between false-belief understanding and the ability to master the syntax
of complementation: the dependence and the independence of false-belief understanding on syntactic complementation.
Method:
We analyze studies on children with typical development, deaf children with deaf signing or hearing parents, children with specific
language impairment, children diagnosed with autism spectrum disorder, longitudinal and training studies, and studies on adults with
neuropsychological disorders.
Conclusion:
Strengths and weaknesses of the two hypotheses are discussed and limitations of the current state of knowledge are presented. A
lifespan approach taking into account both the emergence and maintenance of false-belief understanding and using both implicit and
explicit false-belief tasks is proposed to face the issue discussed.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Theory of Mind (ToM) is the ability to attribute mental states to others and predict, describe, and explain behavior
based  on  such  mental  states  [1  -  4].  ToM  is  thought  to  be  at  the  core  of  any  successful  social  interactions  and
communication  process  [5,  6],  and  one  of  its  key  components  is  the  False  Belief  (FB)  understanding,  i.e.,  the
understanding of  another  person’s  wrong belief  in  relation  to  one’s  own knowledge of  the  real  state  of  affairs  [7].
Accordingly, ToM is generally tested through classic FB tasks: these tests provide evidence that children can  or cannot
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distinguish between the thoughts and feelings they themselves currently have with those that can be possibly held by
others [8] (but see [9, 10] for critical reviews on FB tasks). Although we know much about ToM and, in particular,
about FB understanding, it is still not entirely clear which factors are involved in its development and maintenance. It is
very complex to study social skills as separate from other abilities as the language, considering also that they develop
around the same life-period [11 - 13]. Over the years, different explanations on ToM development have been given, but
one  of  the  most  interesting  is  the  relationship  between  FB understanding,  and  syntactic  complementation,  i.e.,  the
embedding of one propositional argument under another proposition, as is needed for the expression of propositional
attitudes such as beliefs and states of knowledge [14]. Syntax is a mechanism that allows humans to understand and
construct an infinite number of sentences from a finite number of elements and complementation is the scaffolding of
this mechanism [15, 16].
Here  we  discuss  the  state  of  the  art  of  the  field  and  propose  an  interpretative  structure  presenting  two  main
hypotheses on the relationship between FB understanding, as a key ability of ToM, and complementation, as a crucial
aspect of syntax. To this end, studies on both children with typical or atypical development, longitudinal and training
studies, and studies on adults with neuropsychological disorders are presented and discussed. The different samples
mentioned above allow us also to refer to different dimensions, such as the development, maintenance and deficit of one
or both the abilities taken in to account (FB and/or syntactic complementation)
2.  THE  TWO  INTERPRETATIVE  HYPOTHESES:  THEORY  OF  MIND  DEPENDENCE  OR
INDEPENDENCE UPON SYNTAX
A debated idea is whether we need syntax for the development of the ability to understand FB tasks. According to
the literature, there are two main interpretative hypotheses on the relationship between ToM and syntax, i.e., that ToM
depends on syntax or that ToM and syntax are independent.
As  pointed  out  by  the  hypothesis  of  ToM  development  dependence  upon  syntax,  FB  understanding  owes  its
development to a previously developed linguistic base (e.g., [14, 17]). The proponents of this hypothesis argue that
syntax  and,  more  specifically,  mastery  in  complementation,  support  the  crucial  processes  for  FB  understanding.
According to the linguistic determinism theory proposed by Jill and Peter De Villiers, the acquisition of the ability to
master  the  syntax  of  complementation  in  childhood  provides  the  representative  structure  necessary  for  the
understanding of FBs by converting them into propositional attitudes [14, 18]. When we talk about mental states (e.g.,
“I think that Sally is afraid”), we use a rather complex construction, which consists of the main clause (“I think that...”)
and subordinate clause embedded into the first  (“Sally is afraid”).  An important stage in development occurs when
children  understand  that  the  sentential  complements,  which  depend  on  the  verb  think,  may  be  false  after  careful
comparison with the world. In this syntactical structure, the content can, therefore, have an independent truth value:
sentential complements promote an explicit representation of an embedded subordinate clause with a true-or-false truth
value  [19,  20].  From  this  viewpoint,  syntactic  complementation  is  a  necessary  precursor  to  the  acquisition  of  FB
understanding, offering the means to debate about mental states and reality.
On the other hand, the hypothesis of ToM development as independent of syntax, syntax and ToM are related but
separate skills. As the hypothesis of dependence previously described proposed syntactic complementation as a key
component for FB understanding, we expect that a lack of this ability leads to the collapse of the FB component of
ToM, also when ToM is already acquired. The proponents of this hypothesis argue that mastery in complementation is
not a scaffolding ability for FB understanding, even if these two skills develop in the same life-period. To support the
hypothesis of independence, some researchers conducted studies on adult participants with syntactic deficits to explore
this  issue and found contrasting results.  Case studies  on aphasic  patients,  who pass  ToM tasks despite  their  severe
linguistic deficit, have contributed to a different way to conceptualize the relationship between ToM and syntax. Siegal
and Varley [21] proposed that grammar is marginally important for ToM, although it is an important source for the
mediation  of  conversation.  Evidence  on  patients  with  aphasia  indicates  that  explicit  knowledge  of  grammar  is  not
necessary to scaffold ToM reasoning.
The hypothesis of independence was further supported by studies on ToM reasoning in adult patients with right
hemisphere damage suggesting a double dissociation between grammar on one hand, and ToM and pragmatics, on the
other [22].
The proponents of this hypothesis do not totally deny the utility of syntactic functions in the comprehension of
others’  mental  states.  Complementation  could  facilitate  ToM  when  the  system  fails  but  it  is  not  essential  when
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everything is operating optimally. According to Siegal et al. [23], syntax plays a critical role in reducing mistakes in the
transmission  of  knowledge  but  its  presence  alone  cannot  guarantee  understanding  social  relationships  and
communication.
3. THE TWO INTERPRETATIVE HYPOTHESES: STUDIES FOR DIFFERENT SAMPLES
The studies in the domain under consideration have been conducted at different stages of development (children,
adolescents, and adults) and in samples presenting both typical and atypical development.
3.1. Longitudinal and Training Studies in Typical Development
To understand the relationship between FB understanding and syntactic complementation, various longitudinal and
training studies have been conducted. Longitudinal studies analyzed the development of an ability across the lifespan.
Astington and Jenkins [24] assessed ToM and language development in 3-year-old children over a period of 7 months at
approximately 3.5-month intervals and their results seem to support the hypothesis that the syntactic subcomponent of
language is involved in promoting the development of FB understanding. In a subsequent study on typically developing
3-5-year-old children tested in four sessions over the course of 1 year, De Villiers and Pyers [25] found that the mastery
of  syntax  for  sentential  complements  was  the  best  predictor  of  success  in  FB  tasks.  The  authors  conclude  that
complementation is necessary to enable children to represent the correct syntactic form of others’ belief states in their
own mind.
Training studies attempted to verify the effect of experience. Hale and Tager-Flusberg [26] pre-tested children (ages
36–58 months) with FB and sentential complement tasks to ensure that they had not yet acquired FB understanding or
sentential complements, and with relative clause tasks to assess their ability to include the relative clause information in
their speech. The children were divided into three different groups and assigned to three different training types: the
first was set up on the development of FBs, the second on sentential complements, and the third on relative clauses. The
training was scheduled in two training sessions within one week of each other. After the second training session, all
children were post-tested with tasks similar to those from the pre-test session. The results supported the hypothesis of
linguistic  influence on the development  of  ToM: the training on complementation and the acquisition of  sentential
complements as specific linguistic constructions led to improved performance on FB tasks, in contrast to relative clause
training that did not yield improved FB understanding (see also [27]). Mo et al. [28], in a study involving Mandarin-
speaking children (ages 40–55 months), showed that training on sentential complements depending on communication
verbs (e.g., say) significantly improved FB understanding. The children were divided into four training groups and each
training was scheduled in two 25-minute-training sessions within two weeks of each other and 7-day-interval between
sessions. Interestingly, they also found that FB training only (i.e., without sentential complement training) improved FB
performance but not sentential complement understanding, suggesting that explicit FB understanding can emerge even
when children have little competence with sentential complement constructions.
These studies give a controversial support to the hypotheses: longitudinal studies on typical development seem to
support the hypothesis of dependence, but training studies highlight that also FB training and not only complementation
improve FB understanding.
3.2. Studies of People with Hearing Loss (Deaf and Hard-of-Hearing)
In deaf children born in families with hearing parents, both language ability [29, 30] and FB understanding [31, 32]
are acquired later than in children with typical development. On the contrary, studies on deaf children with signing
parents show that children who learn sign language at an age comparable to those with typical development can fluently
master syntax and display ToM skills comparable to age-matched hearing peers [33]. De Villiers and De Villiers [34]
found  that  FB  understanding  in  orally  taught  deaf  children  is  independent  from  general  vocabulary  skills  but  is
dependent upon the ability to manage false sentential complements.
Interesting findings come from hearing-impaired children with cochlear implants. Remmel and Peters [35] pointed
out  that  in  both  linguistic-syntactic  and  FB  tasks,  these  children  performed  comparably  to  deaf  children  born  into
signing families, with both groups showing better results in verbal than non-verbal ToM tasks. These findings do not
guarantee  the  predictive  ability  to  master  the  complementation  but  merely  attest  to  the  importance  of  previous
conversations about mental states. Holding conversations using meta-representative skills increases the development of
ToM reasoning, and vice versa, an environment lacking interpersonal and communication possibilities often leads to
difficulties in ToM reasoning in deaf children ([31]; on the importance of conversation, see also [36]).
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3.3. Studies of People with Autism Spectrum Disorders
Children  with  Autism  Spectrum  Disorders  (ASD)  face  a  delay  in  the  acquisition  of  syntax  and  significant
difficulties  in  FB  tasks  [37  -  40].  Tager-Flusberg  and  Sullivan  [41]  reported  that  language  ability  predicted  FB
performance with an accuracy of 90% in children with ASD and that syntactic comprehension was the best predictor.
Tager-Flusberg [38] noted that children with ASD, who fail in ToM reasoning tasks, could not deduce the sentential
complementation  in  phrases  depending  on  communication  verbs.  The  syntax  of  complementation  seems  to  be
significant for the development of the representational mind especially in ASD. Similarly, Durrleman et al. [40] set up
an experimental study on children with ASD (ages 6.9 to 14.4 years) and found that non-verbal ToM was significantly
correlated  with  the  understanding  of  complement  clauses.  More  specifically,  by  using  regression  analyses,  they
highlighted that morphosyntax played an important role to determine ToM success (for similar results, see also [42]).
Lind and Bowler [43] noted that the syntax of complementation and performance in FB tasks were significantly
related in children with ASD matched in age and verbal ability with the comparison group, but neither the bivariate nor
the  partial  correlations  between the  two abilities  differed between the  groups.  Whereas,  in  this  study,  correlational
analyses have been carried out, based on these results, it is not possible to identify the direction of causality, but it is
possible  to  observe  a  simple  correlation  between  ToM competence  and  syntax  of  complementation.  Other  studies
adopted a similar position: syntax could facilitate ToM reasoning without implying that this ability is necessary for
ToM development (e.g., [44]).
The studies on People with ASD seem to support mainly the hypothesis of dependence but, as it is pointed out by
some studies, the results could be interpreted as the influence of reasoning rather than the cause of the development of
the FB understanding
3.4. Studies of Children with Specific Language Impairment
Children  with  Specific  Language  Impairment  (SLI)  experience  significant  syntactic  difficulties.  Thus,  several
studies investigated children with SLI to better understand the relationship between syntax and ToM development [45 -
48].
Farrar et al. [47] observed that in preschool children with SLI, general grammar and vocabulary contributed to ToM
reasoning,  whereas  sentential  complementation  abilities  did  not  contribute  independently.  These  findings  not  only
emphasize  the  generic  syntactic  ability  for  overcoming  FB  tasks  but  they  also  display  that  the  ability  in  syntactic
complementation should be less relevant than general language abilities.
Miller [49] pointed out that the mastery of embedded sentential complementation was related to ToM but there was
no  evidence  of  causality.  Miller  compared  three  groups  of  children:  children  with  SLI,  age-matched  children  with
typical development, and younger typically developed children with linguistic abilities similar to those of SLI children.
The experiment consisted of four conditions applied to FB tasks. Children with SLI had linguistic abilities that are
below age expectations but they showed intact other cognitive skills including ToM abilities (see also [50]). This study
showed that children with SLI performed like younger children in the linguistically demanding “think” and “pretend”
conditions, but they were more similar to their age-matched peers in the “look” and “show” conditions. These results
emphasize  that  FB  understanding  and  complementation  are  not  causally  related,  even  if  they  are  required  for  the
linguistic demands of some ToM tasks (see also [46, 51]).
The main studies on children with SLI maintain a more cautious position in the interpretation of the results: the data
presented do not allow one to lean for one or the other hypothesis, even if they detect some kind of influence between
the two components in analysis.
3.5. Studies of Patients with Aphasia
In order to analyses the relationship between ToM and syntax, here we discuss three case reports of patients who
became aphasic following damage to the left hemisphere.
Varley  and  Siegal  [52]  were  the  first  to  systematically  investigate  the  relation  between  grammar  and  ToM by
studying  patients  with  aphasia.  They  reported  the  case  of  S.A.,  a  patient  with  severe  agrammatic  aphasia  but  with
preserved  ToM  reasoning.  S.A.  had  a  large  left  hemisphere  lesion  that  affected  his  linguistic  abilities,  except  for
sentence  comprehension  mediated  by  a  more  general  preserved  pragmatic  competence.  His  spontaneous  writing
consisted of article-noun, adjective-noun, and quantifier-noun combinations without grammatical  structure.  Despite
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these impairments, preserved ToM understanding tested with FB tasks and executive functioning was observed. This
dissociation was also noted in two other cases: M.R., reported by Varley et al. [53], revealed impaired performance in
executive  functioning  and  linguistic  tasks  but  retained  ToM  reasoning  in  a  picture-based  task.  P.H.,  a  patient
investigated  by  Apperly  et  al.  [54],  showed  severe  agrammatical  aphasia,  similar  to  S.A.  and  M.R.,  with  specific
impairment in embedded complement sentences and relative clauses. Despite these difficulties, ToM reasoning tested
on non-verbal first-order and second-order FB tasks was above chance. Similar findings were reported by Ramachandra
and  Mikajlo  [55]  (see  also  [56];  for  a  brief  overview  see  [21]).  In  sum,  case  studies  of  patients  with  aphasia  are
presented  by  researchers  advocating  the  independence  of  ToM  from  grammatical  abilities,  proposing  that  ToM
reasoning  is  possible  even  when  specific  grammatical  constructions  are  impaired.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
The role of language in ToM is well recognized, but the relative contribution of different language aspects remains
debated [57 - 60]. In the present work, we have focused on the relationship between FB understanding and syntactic
complementation with a controversial emerging picture.
First, the linguistic determinism theory has had a strong influence but has not been without criticisms. Studies in
line with this theory mainly come from longitudinal and training studies and from studies with deaf children born into
hearing families. However, contrasting results were observed as well. For example, Lohmann and Tomasello [27] found
in their training study that sentential complement syntax is sufficient for FB understanding in experimental settings, but
it might not be a necessary condition in FB comprehension in ecological conditions. Studies on children speaking non-
English  languages  did  not  support  the  effectiveness  of  training  on  ToM  performance.  In  a  study  on  Swedish
preschoolers, Clausen-Bruun [61] found no evidence supporting the role of active production of tensed complements
(i.e., full propositions embedded within sentences) in ToM development. A study by Perner et al. [62] reported that
German children  understand desires  earlier  than  beliefs,  although both  verb  types  take  compliments  with  a  similar
structure.  Cheung  [63]  and  Tardif  et  al.  [64]  found  that  in  Cantonese-speaking  children,  general  language
comprehension,  rather  than  specific  language  structure  per  se,  accounted  for  FB  understanding.  Tompkins  [65]
proposed  that  an  important  aspect  for  the  prediction  of  children’s  FB  understanding  could  be  the  mother’s  use  of
contrastives (i.e., the complement syntax that directly contrasted thought and reality). Comparing mothers’ cognitive
state talk assessed during shared book reading with 3- to 5-year-olds in relation to children’s FB understanding six
months later, the authors found that, in opposition to the mother’s use of contrastives, nor the total use of cognitive state
vocabulary  neither  the  complement  syntax  using  the  verb  “think”  predicted  children’s  FB  understanding.  In  their
interesting  review,  Farrar  and  colleagues  [66]  analyze  different  studies  and  suggest  that  it  seems  that  syntactic
complementation has an influence only on atypical development and not also in typically developing children, where
general language seems to have a more relevant effect.
Second, to understand why studies investigating the relationship between syntax and ToM yielded mixed results, it
is important to pay attention to the nature of the experimental tasks. Many ToM tasks are not cognitively equivalent and
might draw on divergent mental abilities, which is a first limitation of the current literature. As emphasized by Apperly
et al. [67], there is no definitive evidence for the domain specificity of ToM, especially belief understanding assessed
with FB tasks.  FB tasks are not well  suited to study the relationship between ToM and syntactic complementation,
because just passing these tasks requires abilities other than ToM, such as attention and memory [68]. Furthermore, it is
important to keep in mind that FB tasks normally used in literature vary for the kind of FB understanding assessed,
explicit or implicit [69]. In the former kind of assessment the participant is asked to predict a behavior explicitly by
means of a verbal answer consciously controlled, while in the latter kind of assessment procedural non-verbal behaviors
such as anticipatory looking or eye gaze are used as an indirect measure of FB understanding. The difference between
implicit  and  explicit  ToM  was  firstly  addressed  by  Clements  and  Perner  [70]  who  analyzed  eye  movements  and
distinguished  a  period  of  implicit  understanding  of  FB  preceding  the  onset  of  explicit  understanding.  In  their
experiment, children ages 2 years 11 months were able to look at the correct solution in a FB scenario although they
verbally answered incorrectly. Subsequently, Baillargeon [9, 71, 72], using a violation-of-expectation method, reported
that 15-month-old infants already show some implicit understanding of FB when tested with an entirely non-verbal task
(although explanations of these results not invoking FB understanding have been proposed, see [73, 74]).
Explicit and implicit FB understanding may dissociate during development and in atypical populations [75] but are
closely related in typical adults [76]. Thus, future research should carefully consider the kind of tasks used to assess
ToM abilities  and  use  a  mix  of  tasks  covering  both  implicit  and  explicit  processes  (even  considering  that  children
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understand diverse beliefs before FBs, as well as different mental states before belief, with a progression from desire to
diverse belief to FB [77]).
Third,  the  findings  by  Low  [78]  in  3-  and  4-year-olds  indicated  that  while  in  explicit  FB  tasks  a  relationship
between  ability  for  syntactic  sentential  complements  and  FB  performance  is  detectable,  this  is  not  the  case  when
implicit FB is assessed in this population. On the other hand, the findings by Newton and De Villiers [79] show that in a
dual-task setting in adults (ages 18–35), verbal shadowing disrupts the ability to monitor a character’s belief in a non-
verbal FB task. In contrast, Forgeot d’Arc and Ramus [80] presented a completely non-verbal paradigm and observed
an independence between FB understanding and verbal reasoning in adulthood. The results show that, actually, verbal
shadowing decreased the overall performance and not only FB understanding. Similarly, Dungan and Saxe [81] found
that success in FB tasks in adulthood is equal during verbal and non-verbal interference; these results show that verbal
shadowing has no a specific effect, suggesting that syntax is not necessary in FB understanding in adulthood. These
results  are  important  as  they  highlight  the  second  limitation  of  the  current  literature,  a  limitation  concerning  the
comparison of results coming from populations, at least in principle, not comparable.
Fourth, another important question concerns the distinction between the impact of syntax on the development of
ToM understanding and the impact of syntax on ToM understanding when ToM is already acquired. This distinction led
to a different interpretative structure in the discussion of the state of the art of this field, in particular for what concerns
the kind of dependence between syntax and ToM. In fact, the hypothesis of ToM development dependence upon syntax
could be split in two sub-hypotheses: a temporary dependence, i.e., complementation is necessary for the emergence of
FB understanding but this dependence disappears later on, and a permanent dependence, i.e., that complementation is
necessary for the emergence as well as for the maintenance of FB understanding. As previously discussed, findings on
case  studies  of  patients  with  aphasia  are  discussed  by  researchers  advocating  the  independence  of  ToM  from
grammatical abilities; nevertheless, it is important to note that these findings falsify only the permanent dependence
hypothesis, but they can not allow to exclude a temporary dependence between complementation and FB understanding.
One important limitation of the present brief overview is the lack of a careful analysis concerning the influence of
culture on the development of both FB understanding and syntax: the experimental data come from many different
cultures and languages, and culture has an impact on both dimensions of analysis (see for example [82]). Consequently,
the nature of the link between syntax and FB understanding remains unresolved even for reasons related to culture that
makes the comparison between studies thorny.
In conclusion, we tried to identify salient features of both the dependence and independence hypothesis, but the
cases  used  by  the  different  authors  are  not  fully  comparable.  Discussing  the  relationship  between  syntactic
complementation and FB understanding at developmental stages is one aspect, which differs when both functions have
already been acquired [83]. Taking into account the difference between the role played by syntax in ToM development
and in ToM understanding when ToM is already acquired is crucial in facing this issue. A lifespan approach taking into
account both the emergence and maintenance of FB understanding and using both implicit and explicit FB tasks would
be  beneficial  in  the  future.  Adopting  this  comprehensive  approach  would  not  only  have  scientific  value  for  our
knowledge of the relationship between syntax and ToM but would have significant clinical and educational implications
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